Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Harold Edwin (Hal) Rhodes v. John M. Fry and
Judith L. Fry v. William c. Petersen : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott W. Christensen; Hanson, Epperson & Smith; attorneys for appellant.
Fred D. Howard, Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Rhodes v. Fry, No. 900478.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3235

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIE£

KFU
R5.9
tS9
DOCKET NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
F THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JOHN M. FRY and
JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants/Third-party
Plaintiffs/Appellants.
vs.

Case No. 900478

WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,
Third-party Defendant.
APPELLEE'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK

FRED D. HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 3 00 North
Provo, Utah 84601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, for:
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

NOV 2 1 1990
Clerk, Supreme Court. Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JOHN M. FRY and
JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants/Third-party
Plaintiffs/Appellants.
vs.

Case No. 900478

WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,
Third-party Defendant.
APPELLEE'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK

FRED D. HOWARD and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 3 00 North
Provo, Utah 84601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, for:
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

2

JURISDICTION

2

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A.

Nature of the Case

3

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

C.

Statement of Facts

...

3
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON EXISTS FOR REVIEW BY
WRIT OF CERTIORARI

9

POINT II
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT FRY WAS NOT NEGLIGENT. . . .

11

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS COMPELLED BY OTHER
PROPER RULINGS WHICH FRY HAS NOT CHALLENGED. . . .
CONCLUSION

17
20

APPENDIX
Diagram of intersection

t

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited;
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). . . 11
Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops. Inc., 351 So. 2d 17 (Fla.
1977)

18

First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780
P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989)

11

French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002
(1950)
15, 16
Gibbons v. Orem City Corp.. 27 Utah 2d 184, 493 P.2d 1280
(1972)

14

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989)

12

Henderson v. Meyer. 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975)
Hughes v. Hooper. 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2d 983 (1967).

16
...

In re Estate of Kesler. 701 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985)

16
11

Intermountain Farmers Ass'n v. Fitzgerald. 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah
1978)

14

King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987)
McCloud v. Baum. 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977)

18
15, 18

Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Ct. App.
1990)

16

Richards v. Anderson. 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959). . . .

16

Smith v. Gallegos. 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965). . . .

14

Solt v. Godfrey. 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971)

16

Stringham v. Broderick. 529 P.2d 425 (Utah 1974)

17

Woodhouse v. Johnson. 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968).
Yearsley v. Jensen. 144 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Oct. 3, 1990).

. 17
. . 10

Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749
P.2d 651 (Utah 1988)

ii

13

Statutes and Rules Cited;
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1990)

2

Utah R. App. P. 11(b)

3

Utah R. App. P. 31

2, 5, 10

Utah R. App. P. 46

2,9

Utah R. App. P. 46(a)

9

Utah R. App. P. 46(b)

9

Utah R. App. P. 46(c)

9

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JOHN M. FRY and
JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants/Third-party
Plaintiffs/Appellants.

Case No. 900478

vs.
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,
Third-party Defendant.
APPELLEE'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Are there any special or important reasons for this Court

to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed,
without opinion, the judgment of the trial court, where there is
no apparent conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals
or this Court, nor any other reason justifying review by certiorari?
2.

Did the trial court err in directing a verdict for the

plaintiff passenger, where the defendant had stipulated that the
plaintiff was not negligent, the trial court had previously
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff's driver based on the
uncontroverted evidence, the accident was not one which would

happen in the absence of negligence, and the evidence established
that defendant was negligent?
3.

If this Court determines that the trial court did err,

should this case be remanded for a new trial on negligence only,
because

defendant

has

not

claimed

any

error

in the

juries

assessment damages?
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
There was no written opinion entered by the Court of Appeals.
The case was decided on an expedited basis under Rule 31 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JURISDICTION
The Order of Affirmance of the Court of Appeals was filed
September 18, 1990.

Defendants' petition for Writ of Certiorari

was filed October 13, 1990.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this

Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The provisions of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure are set forth below.

Plaintiff-Appellee Rhodes is not

aware of any other constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
or regulations which are controlling in this case.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only for special and
important reasons.
The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of another panel of
2

the Court of Appeals on the same issue of
law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has decided a question of state
or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme
Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has
so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or
has so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court as to call for an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has
decided an important question of municipal, state, or federal law which has not
been, but should be, settled by the
Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil action to recover

for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

The criti-

cal parties in this action are appellee Hal Rhodes ("Rhodes") who
is a passenger in an automobile driven by third-party defendant
William C. Petersen ("Petersen").

The Peterson vehicle collided

with a vehicle driven by defendant-appellant John M. Fry ("Fry").
Fry's mother, Judith L. Fry was also named as a defendant based on
her signing of Fry's driver's license application.

The pleadings

Citations to those portions of the record which were
paginated by the trial court clerk in accordance with Rule 11(b)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure will be to "R. [page
number]."
Only one portion of the transcript was so paginated,
that of the testimony of Dr. Rudolph Limpert on the second day of
trial, November 29, 1988. The balance of transcript will be cited
by date and page number, e.g. "Tr. 11-29-88 p.
".

3

at the time of trial included an amended complaint by plaintiff
which

stated

Petersen.

claims

for

(R. 142-45.)

negligence

against

Fry

and

against

Fry had filed a third-party complaint

against Petersen. (R. 90-95.)
The case was tried before a jury commencing November 28, 1988.
(R. 374-86.)

Petersen made a timely motion for directed verdict

as against both plaintiff and Fry. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 102, 109; R.
500.)

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Petersen.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 197.)
Rhodes made a timely motion for directed verdict that he was
not negligent.
granted.

All parties stipulated to the motion, and it was

(Id.)

Rhodes also made a timely motion for a directed verdict that
Fry was negligent.

(Id.) The court took the motion under advise-

ment (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 9), and submitted the case to the jury.
Fry requested, and the court rejected, a jury instruction on
"unavoidable accident.11

(R. 324; Tr. 11-30-88 p. 46.)

The case

was submitted to the jury on a special verdict, but the jury was
instructed

to

answer

questions

relating

to

the

amount

plaintiff's damages regardless of its verdict on negligence.

of
(Tr.

11-30-88 p. 49.)
The jury found that Fry was not negligent.

(R. 303-04.) The

trial court thereafter granted plaintiff's motion for a directed
verdict, which had been taken under advisement during the trial.
(R. 424-30.) The trial court subsequently entered formal Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 448-54) , and a Judgment (R. 45556).

Fry filed his appeal on May 15, 1989.
4

(R. 457-58.)

Follow-

ing the submission of the briefs, the Court of Appeals designated
this case for expedited decision under Rule 31 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Oral arguments were held and the Court of
Appeals thereafter entered its order affirming without opinion the
judgment of the trial court.
C.

Statement of Facts.

The accident giving rise to this

action occurred shortly after 8:00 p.m. on December 11, 1982, at
the intersection of 1300 South and Main Street in Orem, Utah. (Tr.
11-28-88 p. 47; Tr. 11-29-88 p. 8.)

The road on which both

vehicles were traveling, 1300 South, is the main arterial road
leading from the 1-15 freeway to the University Mall in Orem, Utah.
(A diagram of the intersection appears in the Appendix.) Plaintiff
was a passenger in a Volkswagen "bug11 driven by William Petersen.
Petersen and plaintiff were on a double date; plaintiff and his
date were seated in the back seat, and Petersen and his date in the
front seat.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 6.)

The Volkswagen was proceeding

east along 1300 South at a speed less than the speed limit.2 There
was no evidence of any lane changes by the Volkswagen.
29-88 pp. 125, 133.

(Tr. 11-

See also Tr. 11-28-88 p. 64, Tr. 11-29-88 p.

29.) The Volkswagen was travelling in the right-hand (South) lane
of the road.

(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 58; tr. 11-29-88 p. 122.) The road

at that point had two east-bound lanes plus a left-turn lane.

2

Rudolph Limpert, who testified for Fry, estimated the speed
of the Volkswagen at 44 to 48 miles per hour prior to application
of the brakes, and 30 to 35 miles per hour at the point of impact.
(R. 487-88, 493.)
Greg DuVal, who testified for plaintiff,
estimated the speed of the Volkswagen at 38 miles per hour prior
to braking, and 25 miles per hour on impact. (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26.)
Petersen did not recall what speed he was going. (Id. p. 36.) The
speed limit was 55 mph. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 55.)
5

(Exs. 1 & 10, diagrams of accident scene, copies in appendix; Tr.
11-30-88 pp. 16-17.)

The roads were clear and dry, and although

it was dark, the street lights were on and visibility was clear.
(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 7, 32-33; Tr. 11-28-88 pp. 48-49.)
lights on the Volkswagen were on.

The head-

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 24, 132, 140.)

John M. Fry, 16 years old at the time of the accident, was
also on a date.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 31-32.)

His vehicle was pro-

ceeding west on 1300 South. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 123.)

He thought he

was on the road to the Orem Recreation Center, but was confused and
traveling 17 blocks off course in the wrong direction.

(Tr. 11-

28-88 p. 56.) He turned his vehicle left through the intersection
and into the path of the Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-29-88 p. 123.)

The

Volkswagen left 35' 11" of skid marks in the right-hand travel lane
(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 55; Ex. 2), but still collided with sufficient
force to cause the Volkswagen to spin around and to knock all four
occupants of the Volkswagen unconscious.
132.)

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 9, 56,

The four occupants in the Volkswagen therefore had little

memory of the accident itself; however, Becky Jones, Petersen's
date, recalled that she was turned around talking to plaintiff and
his date when she felt Petersen slam on his brakes.

She turned

forward and saw the pick-up in front of the Volkswagen just as the
collision occurred.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 131-32.)

Fry and his date similarly had little memory of the accident.
Fry testified (plaintiff disputed this testimony) that he had been
stopped at a red light prior to entering the intersection, and when
the light turned green, he looked for on-coming traffic, saw none,
and proceeded to make his turn.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 105.) He further
6

testified that his vision was obstructed by a brown station wagon
which was in the eastbound left turn lane and proceeding to turn
left.

(Id.)

He also testified, however, that after making his

initial visual check for on-coming vehicles and starting to make
his turn, he did not again look for traffic in the eastbound lanes.
Fry further acknowledged that his pickup sat "considerably higher
off the road" than the station wagon.

(Tr. 11-29-88 P. 44.)

The impact occurred in the southern most lane when Fry was
nearly through the intersection (Tr. 11-29-88 p. Ill), a distance
of over 50 feet from where he began his turn (Tr. 11-30-88 p. 26. ) 3
It would have taken Fry at least six seconds to travel through the
intersection.

(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 169.) Fry nonetheless unequivocal-

ly testified that he only looked for on-coming traffic prior to
starting his turn and did not look again at any point during the
turn.

(Tr. 11-29-88 pp. 41, 46, 105.)

Plaintiff

suffered

severe and permanent

injuries

in the

accident, and has a 15% permanent partial disability as a result
of the injuries.

(Tr. 11-28-88 p. 161.)

He has suffered and

continues to experience considerable low back pain, with the result
that he cannot participate in sporting and other activities as he
used to, and is limited in his abilities to work and lift objects.

3

This is not different from the testimony of Rudolph Limpert.
Dr. Limpert testified that the pick-up traveled approximately 28.5
feet from the moment that Petersen would have perceived the pickup.
(R. 495.) Limpert gave no testimony concerning the total
distance that Fry traveled across the intersection.
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Review by a writ of certiorari is appropriate only when there
is some special or important reason for such review.

Fry asserts

that the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with other
decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, and that it
constitutes a vast departure from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. Neither assertion, however, is supported by
the arguments in Fry's brief.
The Court of Appeals did not issue an opinion setting forth
any legal holdings; it is therefore impossible for the decision to
conflict with other decisions of the Court of Appeals or this
Court. A review of Fry's arguments reveals that the "conflict" is
really a claim that the Court of Appeals failed to correctly apply
existing judicial precedent.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court departed from
established judicial precedent. The trial court did not, contrary
to Fry's argument, rely on any "negligence per se" concept.

The

trial court determined, in accordance with prior decisions of this
Court, that the accident was caused by the negligence by some
person,

and

was

not

unavoidable.

The

trial

court

further

determined, based on all of the evidence, that reasonable minds
could reach no conclusion other than that Fry was negligent.
Further, even if the decision of the Court of Appeals was a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
it was not so great a departure as to warrant intervention by this
Court.

8

In addition, Fry's assertion that the trial court held that
a statutory violation is negligence per se was not raised before
the trial court or the Court of Appeals.

The argument should not

be considered for the first time on a petition for writ of certiorari.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON EXISTS
FOR REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
Review by writ of certiorari is to be granted "only for
special and important reasons." Utah R. App. P. 46. The types of
cases appropriate for review by certiorari are those where the
Court of Appeals has made a ruling on an issue of law which conflicts with another decision of the Court of Appeals, Utah R. App.
P. 46(a), or of this Court, Utah R. App. P. 46(b), or where the
decision is "so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings . . .

as to call for an exercise of the

Supreme Court's power of supervision . . . ."
46(c).

Utah R. App. P.

This case does not meet any of these criteria.

One of the obvious purposes of allowing review where a Court
of Appeals' decision conflicts with other decisions is to prevent
conflicting precedents. No such risk exists in this case, because
the Court of Appeals did not issue an opinion. There is no opinion

9

which can conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals
or of this Court.4
The holding of the Court of Appeals likewise does not conflict
with other decisions of this Court or of the Court of Appeals.
Fry's claim is really a claim that the Court of Appeals misapplied
the law to the facts, not that the trial court or the Court of
Appeals had decided a question of law in a manner which conflicts
with other decisions. This point is demonstrated more fully below
in Point II of this brief.
The discussion below also reveals that if any error was made,
it did not lead to an unjust result nor constitute so far a departure from the usual course as to call for an exercise of this
Court's power of supervision. The trial court determined, and Fry
did not appeal the determination, that the accident was not one
which would happen in the absence of negligent, and that the other
persons who were in a position to have caused the accident were not
negligent as a matter of law.

The overwhelming weight of the

evidence confirmed the trial court's legal conclusion, and es-

4

Rhodes does not assert that review by writ of certiorari is
never appropriate from a Rule 31 decision of the Court of Appeals.
Such review was granted, for example, in Yearslev v. Jensen, 144
Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Oct. 3, 1990). Rhodes only suggests that the
lack of a published opinion is a factor which this Court should
consider in deciding whether review by certiorari is warranted.
The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, scheduled this case
for disposition under Rule 31. The apparent reason for proceeding
under Rule 31 is that the case involves a narrow issue, the
evidence of Fry's negligence was overwhelming, the supposed "expert
testimony" of Rudolph Limpert did not really address the critical
issue, and justice clearly demanded a speedily resolution to avoid
further delay in giving the awarded damages to Rhodes. These same
factors should persuade this Court to deny the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.
10

tablished that Fry was negligent; indeed, there was no substantial
evidence which would support a finding that Fry was not negligent.
The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals was
correct. Even if there were some technical error in the manner in
which the decision was reached, however, no injustice was done.
This is not a case which calls for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision by writ of certiorari.

The petition should

be denied.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT FRY WAS NOT
NEGLIGENT.
Point I of Fry's Petition asserts that there was competent
evidence to support the jury finding that Fry was not negligent,
relying mainly on testimony that Fry's view of oncoming traffic was
obscured, and that his actions were not unreasonable.

A closer

look at all the evidence refutes the assertion.
The standard to be applied by this court in reviewing the
trial court's directed verdict is whether there was "substantial
competent evidence" which would have supported a jury verdict that
Fry was not negligent.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d

414, 418 (Utah 1989) (quoting In re Estate of Kesler, 701 P.2d 86,
95 (Utah 1985)).

See also First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.

Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Utah 1989).

"Substantial

evidence" has been defined as follows:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence though something less
than the weight of the evidence. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reason11

able mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
No "substantial competent evidence" was presented

in the

instant case which would support a jury finding that Fry was not
negligent.

Although the evidence was conflicting in many par-

ticulars, certain facts were not disputed.

The night was clear,

the roads were dry, and, although it was night, the street lights
were on and visibility was clear.

The Volkswagen in which plain-

tiff was a passenger was in good operating condition, and its
headlights were on.

The Volkswagen had the right of way and was

traveling at a speed well below the posted speed limit.

The

Volkswagen was traveling in the center lane of the three eastbound
lanes and did not make any sudden lane changes immediately prior
to the collision.

In summary, there was absolutely no evidence,

and the trial court properly so held, of any negligence or improper
driving by Petersen, the driver of the car in which plaintiff was
a passenger.

Petersen had a right to be where he was and driving

in the manner he was at the time of the accident.
The evidence further established, without dispute, that Fry
did not have the right of way.

Fry intended to turn left across

three lanes of traffic in an area where the posted speed limit was
55 miles per hour. According to Fry's testimony, he looked for oncoming traffic while his own pickup was stopped for a red light,
but his view of on-coming traffic was at least partially obstructed
by a station wagon in the eastbound left-turn lane. When the light

12

turned green, Fry looked once, did not see any on-coming traffic,
and proceeded to turn.

He traveled approximately 56 feet, taking

approximately six seconds, before reaching the point of impact.
After his initial visual check prior to starting his turn, he did
not again even glance to see if there was any oncoming traffic from
the eastbound lanes. In contrast, Petersen saw Fry and slammed on
his brakes to avoid the accident.

Petersen's vehicle left nearly

36 feet of skid marks in a straight line in the right-hand lane of
travel on Petersen's side of the road.
If Petersen could see Fry, Fry obviously could have seen
Petersen had he been looking.

Fry had a duty to look and see what

there was to see. The accident was totally avoidable had Fry done
so and yielded to Petersen as required.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981), amended bv Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-73 (1988), as in effect at the time of the accident, provided
as follows:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to
the left within an intersection or into an
alley, private road, or driveway shall yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is within the
intersection or so close to the turning vehicle
as to constitute an immediate hazard.
Fry violated this section, and his violation was a factor that
the jury could consider in determining whether he was negligent.5

5

Fry asserts that the trial court improperly held that the
violation of the statute constituted negligence per se. As an
initial matter, this argument is raised for the first time in the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and should not be considered.
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d
651, 657 (Utah 1988). The trial court did not, however, make an
implicit holding of negligence per se. A review of the trial
court's rulings shows that statute was cited only to show the
(continued...)
13

Rhodes acknowledges that there are prior Utah decisions where a
plaintiff has lost at trial against a left-turning driver, and has
attempted on appeal to establish that the left-turning driver was
negligent as a matter of law, and that the jury decisions have been
affirmed. In each of these cases, however, there was €*vidence that
the plaintiff was also negligent.

For example, in Smith v.

Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965), Smith was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Jones which turned left at an
intersection into the path of Gallegos, who was traveling straight
through the intersection.

Smith prevailed at trial, and Gallegos

appealed, claiming that Jones was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law because he had failed to yield the right of way.
This Court affirmed, holding that Jones was entitled to assume, in
determining whether an on-coming vehicle constituted an immediate
hazard, that other drivers were not negligent. The evidence showed
that Gallegos was exceeding the speed limit, had accelerated just
before or while going through the intersection, and may have
suddenly switched lanes just before the intersection.

This Court

held that there was some evidence to support the jury's verdict
that Jones was not negligent in failing to yield to Gallegos.
Of similar effect is Gibbons v. Orem City Corp., 27 Utah 2d
184, 493 P.2d 1280 (1972), which also involved the question of
whether a left-turning plaintiff was contributorily negligence as
a matter of law. The defendant in Gibbons was exceeding the speed

5

(...continued)
existence of a duty on the part of Fry, and was considered only as
evidence of negligence in accordance with Intermountain Farmers
Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Utah 1978).
14

limit, and this Court accordingly affirmed the jury verdict of no
contributory negligence.
Another example is McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977).
The plaintiff was traveling straight through the intersection and
was struck by a car turning left.
100% at fault.

The jury found the plaintiff

The evidence showed, however, that the plaintiff

was exceeding the speed limit and had swerved around a camper and
into the opposing traffic lane just before entering the intersection.
In each of the foregoing cases, the court allowed the jury to
excuse the left-turning driver's failure to yield where the driver
with the right of way was guilty of some negligent or improper
conduct.

No such circumstance existed

Petersen was not negligent.

in the instant case.

The trial court so held based on the

overwhelming evidence, and Fry has not appealed that determination.
Reasonable minds could not differ in finding that Fry negligently
failed to yield the right of way.

To find otherwise would be to

say that a left-turning driver whose view of on-coming traffic is
obscured may nonetheless forge boldly ahead without regard to what
perils may await.
The law forbids such indifference.

In French v. Utah Oil

Refining Co. , 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), for example, the
plaintiff turned left in an intersection in front of the defendant's truck.

The trial court directed a verdict that the plain-

tiff was contributorily negligent for having failed to yield the
right of way.

This Court affirmed and stated as follows:

Regardless of his exact position, plaintiff saw
the truck some 120 feet away from him prior to
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the time he entered the west lane of traffic
and never again noticed it until just prior to
the crash or until it was 6 feet from the point
of impact.
216 P.2d at 1003.
Several other decision have also considered and rejected the
contention that a driver may ignore hazards obscured by other
vehicles.

E.g., Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59

(1959); Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2d 983 (1967).
When faced with a non-negligent victim and a defendant who has
violated the statute, the courts have not hesitated to direct a
verdict of negligence.

Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah

1975); Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971).
All the evidence compelled the holding that Petersen was not
negligent, and that he was doing what he had a right to do and was
where he had a right to be. See Onveabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc. , 787
P.2d 525, 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Fry had a duty to yield to

him and was negligent, as a matter of law, for failing to do so.
There was no substantial competent evidence to the contrary.6

The

Court of Appeals properly affirmed the directed verdict.

Fry points to the testimony of his expert witness, Rudolph
Limpert, who despite extensive testimony of calculations and
theories could only muster a conclusion that the accident was
"unfortunate" and that Fry's conduct was not unreasonable if Fry's
vision of oncoming traffic was blocked.
(Fry claimed that a
station wagon in the left-hand turning lane opposite Fry blocked
his view.)
Mr. Limpert's testimony, however, ignored the undisputed fact that Petersen's vehicle was in the right-hand lane
of travel, did not change lanes prior to the accident, and was in
a position where Petersen could see Fry.
The trial court ordered a transcript of Limpert's testimony,
and granted Rhodes' motion for directed verdict only after
carefully reviewing the transcript and concluding that Limpert's
testimony did not support the jury's verdict.
16

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT1 S RULING WAS COMPELLED BY OTHER
PROPER RULINGS WHICH FRY HAS NOT CHALLENGED.
Fry requested a jury instruction on "unavoidable accidents."
The trial court denied the request because the accident did not fit
in the class of accidents which happen in the absence of negligence.

The trial court also held that neither Rhodes nor the

driver of the vehicle he occupied was negligent.

The net effect

of these rulings, none of which have been challenged by Fry, is
that the accident was caused by the negligence of some person, and
the only possible person was Fry.

This logic is corroborated by

the evidence, set forth above in Point II, that Fry was in fact
negligent.
Utah decisions have recognized a class of accidents which are
"unavoidable":
It is obvious that there are some accidents, i.e.,
unusual and unexpected occurrences, which result in
injury and which happen without any one failing to
exercise reasonable care; and when this is so the
accident is properly classified as unavoidable
insofar as legal causation or the imposition of
liability is concerned.
Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968)
(footnotes omitted).

A later case expressed the same concept:

If either party can avoid an accident by the
exercise of proper care, it cannot be said to
be unavoidable.
The issue of unavoidable
accident arises only where the evidence shows
that the accident happened from an unknown or
unforeseen cause or in an unexplainable manner
which circumstances rebut the defendant's
alleged negligence.
Strinaham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974).
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The converse of this concept is that other accidents (those
which are not unavoidable) are the result of the negligence of some
person.7

Application of this concept was illustrated

in the

Florida case of Davis v. Sobik's Sandwich Shops, Inc., 351 So. 2d
17 (Fla. 1977) . The plaintiff in that case, as in the instant one,
"was an innocent passenger, free of any contributory negligence."
351 So. 2d at 18. The court held that where there was no evidence
to indicate that the injury was the result of an unavoidable
accident, and where there was no evidence that the accident was
caused by anyone not joined in the action, the only possible
conclusion was that one or more of the defendants was at fault.
The court held that "the state of the evidence would require a new
trial if petitioner failed to recover against at least one of the
defendants. A verdict for all the defendants was legally precluded
by the evidence."

351 So. 2d at 18-19.

7

This assertion is not contrary to King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d
618 (Utah 1987), cited on page 19 of Fry's brief for the proposition that a collision alone does not create an inference of
negligence, nor to McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977),
which is cited in Fry's quotation from King. The plaintiff in King
was injured when her car was rear-ended by the defendant in heavy
traffic. The plaintiff in McCloud was injured as he was traveling
straight through an intersection on his motorcycle and was struck
by the defendant's car, which came from the opposite direction and
was turning left. In each case, the plaintiff was found to be 100%
at fault.
The cases stand only for the proposition that an
inference of negligence may not be based solely upon the position
or role of the drivers in the accident (i.e., the following car in
a rear-end collision is not always at fault, nor is the leftturning car in an intersection collision always at fault). The
plaintiff in each case was clearly negligent, so the cases did not
address nore decide the question of whether the mere occurrence of
a collision creates an inference that some person was negligent,
in absence of evidence that the collision was "unavoidable."
18

Each of these factors is present in the instant case.
accident was not unavoidable.

The

Fry's expert, Rudolph Limpert,

ultimately characterized the accident as "unfortunate" (R. 497) ,
and did opine that Fry had not done anything unreasonable, but that
hardly establishes the accident as "unavoidable."

The "unfortu-

nate" circumstance identified by Dr. Limpert was that of an alleged
station wagon in the left hand turn lane opposite from Fry, and
which Fry claimed blocked his view of the Volkswagen.

Even if the

station wagon was there,8 having one's view blocked by another
vehicle when wanting to make a left hand turn is certainly not a
rare or uncommon occurrence. Limpert's blocked view theory ignored
the undisputed fact that whereas the claimed station wagon was in
the left-turn lane, Petersen was two lanes over in the right-hand
lane of travel, and had been in that lane for some distance.
Petersen's view of Fry was not blocked.

The accident could have

been avoided by Fry waiting until the station wagon completed its
turn before starting his turn, or by Fry continuing to look for oncoming vehicles during the course of his turn.

The accident was

not unavoidable as that term has been defined by this Court.
The instant case, therefore, presents a set of circumstances
different from the cases relied upon by Fry. The accident was not
unavoidable.

Fry stipulated that plaintiff was not negligent.

None of the other witnesses recalled any vehicle in the left
turn lane. Kirk V. Vest, who was traveling behind the Petersen
vehicle and who was the only independent witness of the accident,
also testified that he did not recall any other vehicle in the
intersection. (Tr. 11-19-88 p. 124.) He further testified that the
Petersen vehicle made no lane changes or sudden movements prior to
the accident. (Id. at p. 125.)
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The trial court held, and Fry has not appealed that determination,
that Petersen was not negligent.

There was no claim that the

accident was caused by any other person.

The only possible

remaining conclusion is that the accident was caused by Fry, and
this conclusion was supported by the overwhelming weight of the
evidence. The trial court properly directed a verdict against Fry,
and the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.

The decision is in accordance with other decisions

of this Court and of the Court of Appeals.

The result reached is

just. No special or important reason exists to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals.

The petition for writ of certiorari

should be denied.
DATED this / f ^ day of November, 1990.

FRED D. HOWARD and
7/
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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APPENDIX
Diagram of Accident Scene

D

w a

EXPLANATION OF ACCIDENT SCENE DIAGRAMS
The scale on the initial drawings was 1" = 1 0 ' . The scale on
these reductions is approximately 1" =33'.
Exhibit 1 shows the resting place of the vehicles after the
accident.

fl fl

F

indicates Fry's pickup and "P" indicates the

Petersen Volkswagen. (Tr. 11-28-88 p. 50.)
Exhibit 10 shows the probable path of travel of the vehicles
leading to the collision.
(Tr. 11-29-88 p. 165.)

"POI" indicates the point of impact.

The heavy black line from the cross-walk

to the point of impact indicates the approximate length of the skid
marks.

(Id. p. 165.)

The H.96,f reflects the testimony of Newell

Knight of the travel time of the Volkswagen while laying down the
skid marks.
"1.5")

(Id.) The remainder of the heavy black line (next to

reflects Mr.

Knight's

testimony

of

the

distance the

Volkswagen traveled from the point of perception of the Fry vehicle
to the application of the brakes (i.e., the reaction time).
at 177.)
The wavy line is an error.

(Id. at 177-78.)

(Id.

